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Activated June 1,1998, Space and Missile Systems Center Detachment 11, located 
in Colorado Springs, integrates system support management for the Satellite Launch 
Control System (SLCS), MILSTAR, the Defense Meteorological Support Program 
(DMSP), the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and the Global Positioning System 
(GPS). The Detachment performs operational software maintenance, satellite systems 
engineering, space testing and evaluation, and technology master planning. 
Contemporary management theory asserts that the appropriate match of strategy 
and structure determines an organization's level of performance. The Detachment is 
currently organized programmatically. The current programmatic organizational 
structure reflects the influence of Air Force Materiel Command's Integrated Weapons 
Systems Management (IWSM) philosophy. By organizing along product lines, this 
strategy seeks to avoid false procurement savings by holding the System Program 
Directors accountable for the total life cycle cost of a weapon system. The current 
programmatic organizational structure represents the physical manifestation of the IWSM 
strategy and facilitates the vertical integration of all processes necessary to field, deploy, 
and maintain weapon/space systems. The rigid implementation of this strategy and the 
resulting structure impedes horizontal integration of similar processes and equipment 
across the various programs. However, the charter of the Detachment is to provide 
central integrated support for space systems. This strategy seeks to capitalize on 
opportunities for horizontal integration in the ground support of space systems. This 
IX 
study finds that the macro-strategy of Air Force Materiel Command may create friction 
with the Detachment's micro-strategy of providing central integrated support for space 
systems. 
EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY-STRUCTURE FIT 
OF SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER DETACHMENT 11 
I. Introduction 
General Issue 
Space and Missile Systems Center Detachment 11, located in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, at Peterson Air Force Base in the Centralized Integration Support Facility, 
provides integrated space system support for the Satellite Launch Control System 
(SLCS), MILSTAR, Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP), Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS), and Global Positioning System (GPS). Detachment 11 is 
organized along these product lines. This structure, some suggest, precludes meaningful 
integration between programs. Yet this organization is consistent with the Integrated 
Weapon System Management (rWSM) philosophy which has its roots in the early 1980's 
when the Department of Defense acquisition process became the subject of considerable 
attention due to cost overruns. In 1985, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management undertook a comprehensive review of the defense acquisition 
process (Intro to Defense Acquisition Management, 1995: 35). The Commission 
recommended streamlining the reporting chain to allow no more than two levels of 
oversight between the single manager and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) so 
that a clear line of authority exists. After the Defense Management Review (DMR) 
echoed this recommendation in 1989, this soon became policy and infiltrated lower levels 
of management in the form of a philosophy often referred to as Integrated Weapon 
System Management (IWSM). "It empowers a single manager with authority over the 
widest range of decisions and resources to satisfy customer requirements throughout the 
life cycle of the product" (AFMC Pamphlet 800-60, 1993: 12). Essentially, this 
philosophy complements the decision to increase centralization of authority by entrusting 
responsibility for the total life cycle cost in one individual, the System Program Director 
(SPD). This centralization (made possible by the 1992 consolidation of Air Force 
Systems Command and Air Force Logistics Command into Air Force Materiel 
Command) mitigates the temptation to achieve false savings during the acquisition phase 
of the weapon system life cycle only to incur greater expenses during the sustainment 
phase. In short, IWSM seeks to avoid sub-optimization by focusing on the process, as 
opposed to sub-processes, and identifying a process owner to hold accountable. This 
implementing philosophy is designed to capture cost savings associated with vertically 
integrating the acquisition and sustainment organizations. Vertical integration is defined 
as the consolidation of authority for two or more functions of a process previously 
performed by two organizations into one organization, in this case acquisition and 
sustainment. Porter provides a similar definition. "Vertical integration is the 
combination of technologically distinct production, distribution, selling, and/or other 
economic processes within the confines of a single firm. As such, it represents a decision 
by a firm to utilize internal or administrative transactions rather than market transactions 
to accomplish its economic purpose" (Porter, 1980:300). Yet, vertical integration can be 
accomplished without co-locating the sustainment portions of each program. In fact, 
vertical integration between procurement and sustainment might be accomplished better 
without the geographical separation that currently exists between the system sustainment 
managers (SSMs) and their respective SPDs. The purpose behind co-locating the ground 
sustainment portions of each program appears to be horizontal integration. "Several 
studies between 1984 and 1986 concluded that space and warning systems would benefit 
from maintaining normalized system logistics support, rather than 'individualized' 
contractor maintenance, distribution and materiel support" (McGiveney, 1998: 7). 
According to Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, Detachment 11 was created "to 
increase [the] efficiency and focus of our support" (McGiveney, 1998: 7).   On June 1, 
1998, Detachment 11 was activated with a vision of "delivering the full potential of 
integrated space, ground segment, and air technology to America's warfighters" (Mission 
Briefing, undated). 
Specific Problem Statement 
Although the concept of IWSM represents a management philosophy as opposed 
to an organizational structure, it unquestionably manifests itself physically in the form of 
organizational structures. Detachment 11, in accordance with Air Force policy, practices 
the IWSM philosophy and, not surprisingly, its organizational structure exhibits 
characteristics consistent with IWSM. The organizational structure for the Detachment is 
represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Detachment 11 Organizational Structure (Taken from Mission Briefing, undated) 
This organizational structure achieves vertical integration of the acquisition process for 
each program in that each SPD remains accountable for all phases of the acquisition life 
cycle, beginning with the identification of the need and concluding with demilitarization 
and disposal of the weapon system. This thesis explores whether such an organizational 
structure alone provides for sufficient horizontal integration between programs. In 
essence, is the Central Integration Support Facility integrated in form—or name and 
building only? 
Investigative Questions 
The investigative questions to be addressed in this research endeavor stem from 
the problem statement. These include: 
1. Does the Detachment's current organizational structure fit its strategy 
of providing integrated system support management? 
2. If there is a mismatch, what causes the disparity between strategy and 
structure? 
3. What formal or informal organizational mechanisms currently exist to 
facilitate integration between programs? 
4. What improvements can be made in the organization's integration 
mechanisms? 
Scope of Research 
This study examined the current organizational structure of Detachment 11 in an 
effort to determine its ability to facilitate meaningful horizontal integration. The data 
included a review of successful integration through Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
(R-TOC) initiatives as well as situations where horizontal integration failed and why. 
While such examples provided evidence of future potential in this area, the focus 
remained on the organizational structure as opposed to identifying, defining, and 
reengineering the processes currently carried out by the Detachment. 
Thesis Organization 
Chapter I provided the necessary background information, defined the potential 
problem, and outlined the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter II reviews the relevant literature pertaining to organizational strategy and 
structure from both a pragmatic and theoretical perspective. 
Chapter III contains the methodology followed in exploring whether deficiencies 
exist in the strategy-structure match for Detachment 11. 
Chapter IV addresses the primary issues and offers insight into how these issues 
of strategy-structure influence the performance of the Detachment. 
Chapter V states the findings of this thesis by answering the research questions 
while providing potential remedies for deficiencies. 
II. Literature Review 
Pragmatic Literature Review 
Historical Context. The book Acquisition of Defense Systems, edited by J. 
S. Przemieniecki, provides a concise history of the defense acquisition process dating 
back to the establishment of the Department of Defense in 1947. During this early time, 
"the emphasis was on simplicity, reliability, and producibility. The DoD lacked any 
formal authority to control the acquisition process, having been designed to be a loose 
confederation of the three military departments that was designed to provide loose 
guidance to each department" (sic) (Przemieniecki, 1993: 13). This individuality in the 
acquisition process continued into the 1950s but saw a shift in emphasis towards 
customization. "The emphasis moved from an industry like the automobile industry, to 
an industry that was more custom design and development, where contracting played a 
major role" (Przemieniecki, 1993: 13). Toward this end, the Air Force saw fit to separate 
the research and development of weapon systems from its support. They re-organized to 
accomplish this division by splitting Air Materiel Command into (1) the Air Research 
and Development Command responsible for research and development and (2) the Air 
Materiel Command which assumed responsibility for the acquisition and support of 
systems (Przemieniecki, 1993: 13). This increase in weapon system complexity 
perpetuated a corresponding increase in customization and lead to the services adopting a 
project management organization. In 1961, the Air Force created Air Force Systems 
Command to focus on development and acquisition and Air Force Logistics Command to 
focus on sustainment. Under the leadership of Robert McNamara, an advocate of 
centralized control, defense acquisition organizations reverted back to an organizational 
structure similar to that prior to the division of Air Materiel Command when program 
managers received responsibility for both developing and producing weapon systems 
(Przemieniecki, 1993: 14). In 1968, David Packard, an advocate of decentralized 
management, began divesting more responsibility to the individual services. In doing so, 
Packard created DoD Directive 5000.1 which was based on his view "that successful 
development, production, and deployment of major defense systems are primarily 
dependent on competent people, rational priorities, and clearly defined responsibilities" 
(Przemieniecki, 1993: 15). Problems within the defense acquisition process began 
receiving increased scrutiny during the 1980's with such scandals as the perceived 
overpricing of spares on the B-l bomber. Acting to correct such problems, a 
commission, chaired by David Packard, studied such inadequacies of the system and 
provided several recommendations for improvement to include: (1) creating the position 
of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, (2) creating service acquisition executives 
who report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and their Service 
secretaries, (3) creating Program Executive Officers to manage specified types of 
programs, and (4) creating the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
the chairman of the Joint Requirements and Management Board (Blue Ribbon Report, 
1986: 57). Such recommendations were largely ignored until the Defense Management 
Review of 1989 undertook the effort of implementing the Packard Commission's 
recommendations. Consistent with the Packard Commission's emphasis on the need for 
program managers to have clear responsibility over their programs, in 1992 the Air Force 
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Consolidated the responsibilities of Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics 
Command by merging the two commands to create Air Force Materiel Command. 
Regulatory/Policy Guidance. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 38-1, entitled 
"Manpower and Organization," and AFPD 63-1, entitled "Acquisition," outline the 
guiding principles of Air Force organizational structure. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38- 
101 and AFI 63-101 implement these policies, respectively. In addition, Department of 
Defense (DoD) Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2R provide guidance with respect to the 
management philosophy of Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD). 
AFPD 38-1 succinctly outlines the principal characteristics of Air Force 
organizations. These characteristics include mission orientation, unambiguous command, 
decentralization, agility, flexibility, simplicity, and standardization. The first 
characteristic, and most germane to this discussion, is mission orientation. 
"Organizations should have a reason to exist and should be designed to achieve the 
outcome defined in the applicable mission directive" [emphasis added] (AFPD 38-1, 
1996: 1). Although not explicitly stated, this definition engenders the idea of creating an 
organizational structure that complements the organizational strategy of the unit. 
AFPD 63-1, AFI 63-101, as well as DoD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 provide 
specific guidance pertaining to the structuring of acquisition organizations. However, 
they differ from AFPD 38-1 and AFI 38-101 in that they offer less concrete examples of 
acceptable organizational structures. Whereas AFI 38-101 actually mandates 
standardized organizational structures for most Air Force organizations (and notably 
excludes the structuring of acquisition organizations), the others only speak in abstract 
terms of the IPPD management philosophy. This management philosophy stresses both 
the importance of holding one individual responsible for the life cycle management of a 
weapon system and the use of multidisciplinary teams from the "first through the final 
milestones of the program" (AFI63-101, 1994: 2). Thus, the instruction emphasizes the 
importance of vertically integrating the acquisition and sustainment processes as well as 
horizontally integrating functional disciplines within the specified programs. However, 
all guidance appears void of encouraging integration between acquisition program 
offices. 
Air Force Materiel Command Pamphlet 800-60 reinforces this idea. The 
pamphlet stresses the importance of vertically integrating the acquisition and sustainment 
processes. 
Over the last four decades, Air Force Systems Command and Air Force 
Logistics Command pursued textbook concepts of product management 
and organizational design. Each optimized its strategies towards its 
assigned mission.   Air Force Systems Command focused on the front end 
of the weapons system life cycle and stressed the technology and 
acquisition elements, while Air Force Logistics Command focused on 
wartime readiness and sustainability for the long haul. Bridging 
organizations were often established to cross the "seams" created along 
mission boundaries. (AFMCP 800-60, 1993: 35) 
In an effort to create a seamless organization, Air Force Systems Command and Air 
Force Logistics Command merged in July 1992. 
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Theoretical Literature Review 
Structure and Strategy—Defined. The concept of an organizational structure 
engenders much more than the lines of authority represented on an organizational chart. 
Many authors choose to define an organizational structure in the context of the argument 
being advanced while ignoring other aspects of an organization. For instance, Weber's 
studies focused heavily on bureaucratic organizations and, not surprisingly, he viewed 
organizations largely in terms of lines of authority (Weber, 1946). This bureaucratic 
model is only one of a myriad of models that help conceptualize an organization and its 
behavior.   Katz and Kahn (1969) viewed structure in terms of the intent of the 
organizational architect stating that "the common sense approach to understanding an 
organization is to regard it simply as the epitome of the purposes of its designer, its 
leaders, or its key members" (Katz and Kahn, 1969: 15). They advance a systems theory 
approach whereby managers are "basically concerned with problems of relationships, of 
structure, and of interdependence rather than with the constant attributes of objects" 
(Katz and Kahn, 1969: 18). Despite these and other competing models, organizational 
theorists generally provide similar definitions for organizational structure. Galbraith's 
concept of organizational structure captures the prevalent characteristics found 
throughout the relevant literature by defining organizational structure in terms of four 
characteristics: specialization, shape, distribution of power, and departmentalization 
(Galbraith, 1995: 20). Specialization refers to the division of labor among tasks. It 
reflects the degree to which the tasks are broken down into subunits. Organizational 
shape is the concept more commonly referred to as span of control and gives an 
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indication as to the number of management layers in the organization. Distribution of 
power encompasses two concepts: (1) vertical and (2) horizontal distribution of power. 
Vertical distribution refers to the degree of centralization or decentralization of power 
between managers and non-management personnel. Horizontal distribution of power, 
however, refers to the relative influence of each department or work unit. Finally, 
departmentalization refers to the "choice of departments to integrate the specialized work 
and form a hierarchy of departments" (Galbraith, 1995: 24). Departmentalization options 
include functional, product-oriented, geographical, process-oriented, and customer 
oriented. The following excerpt from a contemporary management textbook lends 
credibility to the assertion that Galbraith's perspective reflects the norm. 
Organizations create structure to facilitate the coordination of activities 
and to control the actions of their members. Structure itself is made up of 
three components. The first has to do with the degree to which activities 
within the organization are broken up or differentiated. We call this 
complexity. Second is the degree to which rules and procedures are 
utilized. This component is referred to as formalization. The third 
component of structure is centralization, which considers where decision- 
making authority lies (Robbins, 1993: 487). 
Thus, Galbraith's definition provides a suitable framework for understanding 
what constitutes organizational structure. 
The concept of an organizational strategy tends to be more simplistic and 
straightforward. Mintzberg and McHugh refer to strategy as the trend or pattern in both 
the decisions and actions of organizations (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985: 161). They 
further argue an organization's intent is largely irrelevant. While organizations generally 
undertake some formal or deliberate strategy initiatives, sometimes strategies emerge 
despite a lack of deliberate planning and are referred to as emergent strategies. This 
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provides a more robust definition than earlier ones that only addressed the deliberate 
dimension of strategy (Tilles, 1963; Newman and Logan, 1971; Andrews, 1980). 
Differentiation and Integration. Lawrence and Lorsch provide a definitive 
framework for viewing differentiation in organizations. Their book Organization and 
Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration is the preeminent study in the 
field of organizational differentiation and defines differentiation as "the difference in 
cognitive and emotional orientation among managers in different functional 
departments." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 11) Lawrence and Lorsch undertook a 
study of six companies competing in the plastics industry to determine how they react in 
their "diverse and dynamic environment" (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 23). They 
contend that organizational growth necessarily requires differentiation and specialization 
making integrative mechanisms an imperative. They use the simple analogy of the 
human body to convey their point. The human body consists of many highly 
differentiated organs and systems. Organizations consist of differentiated functions, 
processes, or programs. The ultimate success or demise of the human body or 
organization, however, depends on the overall integration of these subunits (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967: 7). They provide essentially four perspectives for viewing 
differentiation within an organization: goal orientation, temporal differentiation, 
interpersonal differentiation, and structural differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 
9-10). "Differentiation is the degree to which departments differ in structure (low to 
high), members' orientation to a time horizon (short to long), managers' orientation to 
other people (permissive to authoritarian), and members' views of the task environment 
(certain to uncertain)" (Hellriegel, 1998: 525). These dimensions of differentiation, 
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however, do not necessarily represent an organizational evil. In fact, some conflict is 
inevitable and, when handled appropriately, is beneficial to the organization. 
It is our view, given the need for differentiated ways of working and 
points of view in various units of large organizations, that recurring 
conflict is inevitable. The important question which we have tried to 
answer is how the specifics of each conflict episode can be managed and 
resolved without expecting conflict to disappear. In other words, how can 
integration be facilitated without sacrificing the need for differentiation 
(Lawrence andLorsch, 1967: 13). 
Managers too often view differentiation and integration in dichotomous, polar terms. 
This may be the result of the inverse nature of the two. Organizations with such 
managers react by re-organizing to focus on one or the other. Instead, managers should 
view the organizational choice as a continuum where they must find the most appropriate 
balance between the two for a given situation. A difficult decision even for simple 
organizations, the choice becomes more complicated as the technical complexity of the 
industry increases (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 25). 
Structural Alternatives and Integration. Galbraith provides a comprehensive list 
of the various structures along with the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
each design. He also suggests some criteria for choosing the appropriate structure for a 
given situation.   As previously mentioned, the most common designs include: functional, 
product line, customer-aligned, geographical, and process-oriented. Table 1 synthesizes 
Galbraith's work. 
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Table 1. Structural Alternatives 
Structure Criteria Advantages Disadvantages 
Functional Modestly-sized 
companies 







communications within a 
specialty thereby 
stimulating cross-flow of 
ideas between projects 
(2) Provides a high level 
of specialization 
(3) Can provide 





(5) Reduces duplication 
(1) Cannot effectively manage 
a diverse product line 








(1) Facilitates cycle time 
reduction 
(2) Provides greater focus 
and specialization 
(3) Manages cost as a 
system 
(1) Fails to facilitate 
communication between 
products which leads to 
redundancy 
(2) Loss of economies of scale 
and leveraging 
(3) Presents multiple faces to 
customers using more than one 
of the organization's products 
Customer Buyers insist 
on dedicated 
organizational 
units to satisfy 
their needs 





(1) Often results in duplication 
of function 







(1) Increases focus on 
regional concerns 
(1) Often results in duplication 
of functions 




identified a few 
stable 
processes 
(1) Facilitates total 
quality initiatives 
(2) Facilitates cross- 
functional 
communication 




minimizing safety stock 
(1) Fails to remove all "seams" 
in an organization 
(2) Currently fashionable 
which leads to the suppression 
of adverse comments 
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Galbraith, however, acknowledges that despite the apparent prescriptive nature of his 
taxonomy, many times the situation facing a manager fails to provide a discrete or single 
solution. Walker and Lorsch suggest the same in stating that "of all the issues facing a 
manager as he thinks about the form of his organization, one of the thorniest is the 
question of whether to group activities primarily by product or by function" (Lorsch and 
Lawrence, 1970: 36). Using a case study approach, they found that organizations often 
"oscillate between the two choices" due to the complexity of the issues involved. 
Eventually, organizations move away from a polarity management concept and try to 
affect a compromise between differentiation and integration. 
Given the inverse relationship that exists between differentiation and integration, 
how does a manager achieve high levels of both? Lawrence and Lorsch address this 
paradox specifically and conclude that the answer lies in integrative mechanisms, in 
general, and the personnel or integrators, in particular (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 53). 
Walker and Lorsch offer three methods for achieving integration: (1) cross-functional 
teams, (2) use of integrators, and (3) matrix organizations (Lorsch and Lawrence, 1970: 
52). Regardless of the method, those charged with integration must possess two principal 
personality qualities or traits. First, the integrator must demonstrate a high level of 
collegial leadership. Differentiation between products is often demonstrated in the form 
of conflict between managers or peers. Integrators, therefore, must possess an ability to 
lead among peers. Second, they must have a strong but broad technical background in 
the areas in which integration is sought. Integrators must possess both referent and 
expert authority. Although these are the two most significant determinants of success, 
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legitimate authority is important as well. Most organizations formally designate and 
assign responsibility for integration to an individual, team, or office. 
Burns and Stalker (1971) suggest that sometimes integration is best achieved 
through de-differentiation. In their study of the electronics industry, they appear to reach 
the conclusion that such integration mechanisms noted by Lawrence and Lorsch represent 
dysfunctional aberrations of mechanistic or bureaucratic organizations. 
Enlarging the commitment of the individual to the concern in such a way 
as to admit of the adaptation of the working organization to its own larger 
commitment to the new situation confronting it, proved only partially 
possible to most firms [particularly those with bureaucratic 
ideologies].. .In these concerns the effort to make the orthodox 
bureaucratic system work (because it was seen as the only possible mode 
of organization, and because the enlargement of commitments to the 
concern was abandoned as hopeless or never seriously contemplated) 
produced dysfunctional forms of the mechanistic system (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961: ix). 
Jacobson captures this idea in stating that "a tension exists between coordination and 
specialization in organizations, one which bureaucracy tends to resolve in favor of 
specialization" (Jacobson, 1998: 89). Jacobson suggests that such a preference explains 
critical reviews of under-performing bureaucratic organizations. Bureaucratic 
organizations exhibit high levels of differentiation to include: "segmented labor 
processes, functional departments, hierarchical levels, and narrow organizational 
purviews which discourage inter-organizational collaboration" (Jacobson, 1998: ix). This 
segmentation results in narrowly defined objectives that encumber integration efforts. 
"Organizational theorists have long noted how the bureaucratic compartmentalization of 
functions and the separation of conception and execution result in a number of problems, 
including the displacement of ends by means and conflict between different 
17 
organizational units" (Jacobson, 1998: ix). In lieu of such aberrations, Burns and Stalker 
suggest expanding the roles of workers beyond mere specialists, as perpetuated by the 
segmented roles of bureaucracy, towards generalists. In short, Burns and Stalker 
advocate organizational change away from mechanistic organizations towards organic 
ones when the organization operates in an unstable environment. 
Galbraith, however, fails to go as far. Instead he finds a middle ground that 
compromises between the two. Galbraith proposes interdepartmental programs to 
broaden the professional knowledge of employees. Such programs promote an awareness 
of lateral processes allowing for the development of inter-departmental relationships that 
lead to improved communication and coordination (Galbraith, 1995: 50). Such a 
program cultivates individuals capable of assuming the role of integrator. The integrator 
role is a necessity if a concern is to create a "truly multidimensional organization. There 
is a need for these roles when a company wants to attain excellence, generate new 
products and services, and be responsive to customers" (Galbraith, 1995: 67). To achieve 
such excellence, Galbraith outlines eight important factors essential to creating an 
appropriate power base for integrators: "structure of the role, staffing choice, status of the 
role, information systems, planning process, reward systems, budget authority, and dual 
authority" (Galbraith, 1995: 69). Within the organization, he advocates that the 
integrator report directly to the general manager or equivalent to signify the importance 
of the role. Galbraith's recommendations for staffing choice is similar to that previously 
described for Lawrence and Lorsch. The importance of interpersonal skills cannot be 
overstated. Technical expertise is important but secondary. The status element involves 
assigning a rank commensurate with the position. Since the lead integrator should report 
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directly to the general manager, a high-ranking individual should fill the position. 
Multidimensional information systems offer the integrator greater insight across products. 
Information systems gain added importance considering the need to permit integrators to 
participate in the planning process. Budget and dual authority place the bite in the dog 
allowing the integrators to control at least some portion of the personnel and budget. 
Finally, the reward system must be structured so as to promote integrators at the same 
rates as other positions to demonstrate organizational commitment. 
Strategy and Structure—The Relationship. Alfred Chandler's book Strategy and 
Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, first published in 1962 
and again in 1990, represents the seminal work in this area. In his book, Chandler 
demonstrated through empirical study of well known companies such as Du Pont, 
General Motors, and Sears that changes in strategy demanded subsequent changes in 
structure. For instance when a company decided to pursue a strategy of product, market, 
or geographical diversification, they normally altered their corporate structure to reflect 
greater departmentalization. This led to attempts by others to document the link between 
strategy and structure. In a series of doctoral dissertations emanating out of the Harvard 
Business School, Chandler's study was replicated for Britain (Channon, 1973), France 
(Pooley-Dias, 1972), and Germany (Thanheiser, 1972). 
The preceding literature focused predominantly on the macro-level of the strategy 
and structure of the firm. In contrast, Herman Boschken argues that the more appropriate 
link between strategy and structure occurs instead at the microstructure. He maintains 
that his results not only re-confirm Chandler's original findings but serve as a better 
predictor of performance. He found that at the sub-unit level, the three variables labeled 
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differentiation, strategic competence, and integration influence the strategic behavior of a 
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Figure 2. Microstructure Relationship to Strategy (Taken from Boschken, 1990: 149) 
Chakravarthy (1982) asserts more than a mere correlation between strategy and 
structure. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of matching a strategy with an 
appropriate organizational structure in order to achieve optimum performance. This, 
however, constitutes an iterative rather than a one-time process as an organization must 
continually adapt to its ever-changing environment. The manager seeks to modify his or 
her organization because an "optimum strategy-structure match yields a superior 
performance" (Jennings and Seaman, 1994: 459). Also noteworthy of Chakravarthy's 
work is his discussion of the causal direction. Many contend strategy influences structure 
or vice versa. However, Chakravarthy offers an alternative view to the "chicken and egg 
question" (Chakravarthy, 1982: 42). He suggests that the two are interrelated and 
influence each other as a firm adapts to its environment. 
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Although different studies suggest a causal relationship in one or both directions 
between strategy and structure, the issue of temporal precedence is not one that affects 
the issue facing Detachment 11 and the diagnostic approach of this study. The notable 
theme that emerges from all the literature is that an organization's strategy and structure 
must complement each other if a firm is to optimize its performance. To a large extent, 
structure constitutes a physical manifestation of strategy. Incongruence can only lead to 
sub-optimal results. Richard Nelson succinctly conveys this with the following example: 
Structure involves how a firm is organized and governed, and how decisions 
actually are made and carried out, and thus largely determines what it actually 
does, given the broad strategy. A firm whose strategy calls for being a 
technological leader that does not have a sizeable R&D operation, or whose R&D 
director has little input into firm decision making, clearly has a structure out of 
tune with its strategy (Nelson, 1991: 67). 
Therefore, an organization's strategy must complement its structure if it is to achieve its 
organizational goals. 
Although such assertions seem tautological in nature, the issue becomes less 
definitive in complex organizations. Such organizations frequently have subunits that are 
structured in a different way than that of the whole. However, Fredrickson provides a 
suitable answer to this problem. In considering this issue, Fredrickson focuses on "the 
structure that best describes the whole organization" which he terms the dominant 
structure (Fredrickson, 1986: 281). This dominant structure and the accompanying 
dominant strategy, affect the strategic direction of the organization. 
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Summary 
The relevant literature provides a consistent framework for considering the 
organizational issues of integration and differentiation as well as strategy and structure. 
A consensus of the literature suggests that the level of integration and differentiation 
represents a common source of frustration in most organizations. Such frustration 
typically stems from viewing the two in polar, dichotomous terms. Instead of adopting 
an either-or approach, successful organizations create mechanisms such as cross- 
functional teams and formal integrators to defy the magnetic field and achieve high levels 
ofboth. 
The literature on strategy and structure is also consistent. Although some 
disagreement exists as to the placement of strategy and structure, the literature is clear 
that a disconnect between the two results in poor performance. The issue becomes more 
difficult in complex organizations that have subunits with plural organizations. Despite 
such plurality, a dominant structure and strategy exists. This strategy and structure 
significantly affects the strategic direction of the organization. 
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III. Methodology 
Overview and Justification 
The type of research undertaken in this study lended itself to a qualitative 
approach, in general, and a case study approach, in particular. This approach was 
adopted in an effort to determine whether an appropriate strategy-structure match for 
Detachment 11 currently exists. "Case studies can be used to accomplish various aims: 
to provide description (Kidder, 1982), test theory (Pinfield, 1986; Anderson, 1983), or 
generate theory (e.g., Gersick, 1988; Harris & Sutton, 1986)" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 535). 
Pursuant to Eisenhardt's approach, the basic research questions were established up front 
to focus the research and limit the amount and types of data collection required. In doing 
so, however, the frame of reference necessarily narrows thereby limiting the 
generalizability of any potential findings and conclusions. 
Robert Yin confirmed Eisenhardt's findings in his book Case Study Research: 
Design and Methods and provided examples of when case studies are appropriate to 
include "organizational and management studies" and "the conduct of dissertations and 
theses in the social sciences—the academic disciplines as well as professional fields such 
as business administration, management science, and social work" (Yin, 1994: 1). 
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Yin asserts that in determining whether to use a case study approach or some other 
methodology, the researcher should consider three conditions: 
(1) the type of research question posed 
(2) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events, 
(3) and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events (Yin, 1994:4). 
The case study methodology lends itself to research questions that ask how and why. 
Such questions provide a more effective method for answering contemporary 
organizational relationships in a non-experimental environmental context where the 
researcher lacks control over confounding factors. The contemporary nature of the issue 
precluded the researcher from simply surveying historical documents. Although a 
historical analysis might have provided a starting point, two additional sources of 
evidence needed to be considered: (1) direct observation and/or (2) interviews (Yin, 
1994: 8). Yin's table, incorporated here as Table 2, helped determine the appropriate 
research strategy to use. 
Table 2. Research Method Selection (Taken from Yin, 1994: 6) 





experiment how, why yes yes 
survey who, what, where, how many, 
how much 
no yes 
archival analysis who, what, where, how many, 
how much 
no yes/no 
history how, why no no 
case study how, why no yes 
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The nature of the research question addressed in this thesis complies with the conditions 
and criteria established by Yin. Assessing the current level of integration while 
attempting to identify how it occurs by examining facilitating and inhibiting integration 
mechanisms was a task best undertaken through a case study approach. 
Data Sources 
The research data for this case study came from a variety of sources, both 
qualitative and quantitative in form (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). Given that the research 
attempted to understand the evolution of Detachment 11 's strategy-structure fit in an 
attempt to provide future guidance, process theory served as an appropriate heuristic 
in structuring data collection. "Process research is concerned with understanding how 
things evolve over time and why they evolve in this way (see Van de Ven & Huber, 
1990), and process data therefore consist largely of stories about what happened and who 
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did what when—that is, events, activities, and choices ordered over time" (Langley, 
1999: 691). The graphical representation of Langley's theory is presented in Figure 3. 
Process theory 
Explaining strategic change with 
a process model 
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Figure 3. Process Theory /Visual Mapping (Taken from Langley, 1999: 693) 
Data sources for this research included qualitative sources such as interviews, historical 
documentation such as minutes to meetings, and quantitative sources such as Reduction 
in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) briefings. Through a process referred to as 
triangulation, convergent data from multiple sources strengthens internal validity while 
divergent findings yield the opposite result. "That is, the triangulation made possible by 
multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). 
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Questionnaire Development 
The interview questions were developed to obtain the respondents' organizational 
positions and responsibilities, how long they have held their positions, and whether they 
worked in similar sustainment organizations prior to working in Detachment 11. The 
latter characteristic was used in an attempt to determine whether the formation of the 
Detachment changed the nature of daily work and thereby increased, decreased, or had no 
effect on integration. This differs from the remaining interview questions that were 
formulated to assess the current state of integration within the Detachment. Many of the 
questions were similar in an attempt to assess reliability. For instance if a respondent 
answered in the affirmative that resources are in fact shared across programs, one would 
also expect an affirmative response to the question of whether personnel communicate 
across program lines. Failure to answer consistently would result in asking the 
respondent to provide insight to clarify apparent ambiguities. 
Because the respondents are best situated to provide meaningful insight into the 
daily functioning of the Detachment, open-ended questions were asked to capture this 
knowledge. Respondents received instructions asking for other sources of data that 
would tend to substantiate their positions: 
Since these interviews do constitute the bulk of the data collected, the more 
precise you can be in your answers, the more beneficial your interview will be. 
For instance, an answer such as DOD Instruction 5000.1 does not permit that 
action to be taken would be preferable to the generic answer regulations do not 
permit that action" (Appendix B). 
Yin supports this practice. "Most commonly, case study interviews are of an open-ended 
nature, in which you can ask key respondents for the facts of a matter as well as for the 
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respondents' opinions about events.. .Such persons not only provide the case study 
investigator with insights into a matter but can also suggest sources of corroboratory 
evidence—and initiate the access to such sources" (Yin, 1994: 84). 
Interview Procedures 
Interviews were conducted on location at Detachment 11 for resource practicality 
and to reduce potential respondent anxiety. The interview questions were given to the 
respondents in advance so they could make notes thereby reducing the stress associated 
with recall. The interviewer wore normal office attire and started the interviews with 
brief, informal introductions to further place the respondents at ease. Upon completion of 
the introduction and subsequent to the reading of the instructions, the substantive 
questions were asked. The instructions contained statements asking the respondents to 
provide answers based on their experiences (as opposed to what they thought the 
interviewer would like to hear). 
Research Plan 
In generating an assessment of the state of integration within the Detachment, an 
iterative but systematic process was followed. The essential steps included: (1) defining 
the basic question, (2) selecting cases, (3) establishing data collection methods, (4) begin 
analysis while continuing to collect data, (5) formulating a hypothesis from the analysis, 
(6) continuously comparing the hypothesis with that of existing literature, and (7) 
concluding when additional data provides only marginal improvements in theory 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989: 533). The resulting analysis was continuously compared to the 
existing organizational theory literature to determine emergent concepts. 
Data Collection 
Three principles were followed during data collection: "(1) use multiple sources 
of data, (2) create a case study data base, [and] (3) maintain a chain of evidence" (Yin, 
1994: 90-100). The use of multiple sources tends to increase internal and construct 
validity by providing multiple measures of the same construct. A further attempt to 
accomplish this was to have another researcher draw conclusions from the data. 
Although another interviewer was not present, the recording of the interviews allowed 
others to draw conclusions independent of the researcher. 
The tape recordings and transcripts served as the case study database. "For case 
studies, notes are likely to be the most common component of a database.. .The notes 
may be handwritten, typed, or audio tapes" (Yin, 1994: 95). This concept is somewhat 
interrelated with the third principle. No information collected through the interviews was 
discarded. Although the data collected was used in analyzing the problem and drawing 
conclusions, the evidence presented in the case study write-up normally only represents a 
portion ofthat collected. Thus, the data itself was maintained independent of the case 
study write-up. 
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Strategies for Analyzing Research Data 
The data collected in this study lend themselves to three strategies outlined by 
Ann Langley in her 1999 article published in the Academy of Management Review 
entitled "Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data." These include the narrative, 
visual mapping, and synthetic strategies. 
The narrative strategy involves piecing together a story, or narrative, from the 
research data. This narrative seeks a rationale explanation of events consistent with 
relevant literature, or if different, attempts to determine why. "The aim is to achieve 
understanding of organizational phenomena—not through formal propositions but by 
'providing experience' of a real setting in all its richness and complexity (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985: 359)" (Langley, 1999: 695). This shows the importance of the relevant 
literature in benchmarking and providing vicarious experience. However, the use of the 
narrative strategy in a vacuum threatens to provide only idiosyncratic explanations of 
events. Consequently, the visual mapping and synthetic strategies complement the 
narrative strategy and thereby strengthen the internal validity of any potential findings. 
The visual mapping strategy essentially has the objective of analyzing process 
data to "allow the simultaneous representation of a large number of dimensions so they 
can easily be used to show precedence, parallel processes, and the passage of time" 
(Langley, 1999: 700). This approach reduces relevant data into a graphical representation 
that might show such factors as temporal precedence, causation, and strength of 
correlation. 
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The final strategy involves analyzing the data in the aggregate. This analysis 
seeks to identify events demonstrating similarities in outcomes and relevant variables. 
This consistency is then utilized in synthesizing a theory consistent with the data. "When 
this strategy is used, the original process data are transformed from stories composed of 
'events' to 'variables' that synthesize their critical components" (Langley, 1999: 704). 
Advantages/Limitations of Research Design 
Personal interviews allow the interviewer to observe non-verbal behavior. 
Respondent anxiety might suggest the respondent felt pressure to answer according to his 
or her speculation as to what the researcher expected. The respondent might also feel 
pressure to provide a favorable opinion of his or her organization. Personal interviews 
allow the interviewer to gauge these and other factors better than telephone interviews. 
The instructions, however, brought such potential biases to the respondents' attention so 
they could make a concerted effort to avoid them. The case study design also permits the 
researcher to focus directly on the research topic while providing inferences to causal 
relationships (Yin, 1994: 80). The use of the triangulation approach tends to strengthen 
construct and internal validity while adherence to the three data collection principles 
strengthens reliability. 
Despite the best intentions of the researcher, it may still be difficult to discern the 
intent of the respondents' responses. In addition, the respondent might have had 
difficulty recalling facts and situations from memory during the interview despite best 
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efforts to alleviate this concern by providing the questions in advance. Finally, the focus 
on only Detachment 11 organizations limits external validity. 
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IV. Data Analysis and Findings 
Overview 
This chapter begins with an overview of the job descriptions and experience 
levels of the personnel interviewed. Then, the responses of those interviewed are 
grouped and presented according to the concepts discussed in the literature review. 
Although most individuals consented to having their interviews taped, the transcripts that 
were subsequently prepared are not included in their original form for a variety of 
reasons. First, the level of detail included in the responses would allow those within the 
organization to associate answers with respondents thereby violating the condition of 
anonymity. Second, the transcripts reflect the spoken word, which, at times, fails to flow 
in a cogent manner. Therefore, the portions of the transcripts reflected in this chapter 
have been edited to improve readability. Finally, as previously mentioned, the responses 
are presented according to common themes in an effort to identify both the consistencies 
and inconsistencies in individual perspectives. To the maximum extent practicable, the 
themes will parallel the ideas explored in the literature review. However, other issues 
important to establishing the organizational climate became apparent and are also 
presented. 
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Personnel and Experience 
Those interviewed differed in their level of experience, functional specialty, and 
position in the organizational hierarchy. Everyone interviewed had at least two years 
experience working in the same or similar positions within the Detachment. In some 
cases, personnel had experience in such positions within Detachment 25, the predecessor 
of Detachment 11 and Detachment 5. Functional specialties included contracting 
specialists/officers, program managers, equipment specialists, technical order managers, 
financial analysts, and engineers. The following excerpts from the United States Office 
of Personnel Management Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families outlines the 
responsibilities of these positions. 
GS-1102—Contracting Series. 
This series includes positions that manage, supervise, perform, or develop 
policies and procedures for professional work involving the procurement 
of supplies, services, construction, or research and development using 
formal advertising or negotiation procedures; the evaluation of contract 
price proposals; and the administration or termination and close out of 
contracts. The work requires knowledge of the legislation, regulations, 
and methods used in contracting; and knowledge of business and industry 
practices, sources of supply, cost factor, and requirements characteristics 
(Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families, 1999: 62). 
GS-0340—Program Management Series. 
This series includes all classes of positions the duties of which are to 
manage or direct, or to assist in a line capacity in managing or directing, 
one or more programs, including appropriate supporting service 
organizations, when the paramount qualification requirement of the 
position is management and executive knowledge... (Handbook of 
Occupational Groups and Families, 1999: 27). 
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GS-1670—Equipment Specialist Series. 
This series includes positions the duties of which are to supervise or 
perform work involved in (1) collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and 
developing specialized information about equipment; (2) providing such 
information together with advisory service to those who design, test, 
produce, supply, operate, repair, or dispose of equipment; and/or (3) 
developing, installing, inspecting, or revising equipment maintenance 
programs and techniques based upon practical knowledge of the 
equipment, including its design, production, operational and maintenance 
requirements. Such duties require the application of an intensive, practical 
knowledge of the characteristics, properties, and uses of equipment of the 
type gained from technical training, education, and experience in such 
functions as repairing, overhauling, maintaining, constructing, or 
inspecting equipment (Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families, 
1999: 75). 
GS-1083—Technical Writing and Editing Series. 
This series includes positions that involve writing or editing technical 
materials, such as reports of research findings; scientific or technical 
articles, news releases, and periodicals; regulations in technical areas; 
technical manuals, specifications, brochures, and pamphlets; or speeches 
or scripts on scientific or technical subjects. Technical writers and 
technical editors draw on substantial knowledge of a particular subject- 
matter area, such as the natural or social sciences, engineering, law, or 
other fields. The work involves the development of information and 
analysis to select and present information on the specialized subject in a 
form and at a level suitable for the intended audience (Handbook of 
Occupational Groups and Families, 1999: 61). 
GS-0505—Financial Management Series. 
This series includes all classes of positions the duties of which are to 
manage or direct a program for the management of financial resources of 
an organizational segment, field establishment, bureau, department, 
independent agency, or other organizational entity of the Federal 
Government when the duties and responsibilities include: (1) developing, 
coordinating, and maintaining an integrated system of financial staff 
services including at least accounting, budget, and management-financial 
reporting, and sometimes also one or more of such related staff services as 
auditing, credit analysis, management analysis, etc.. .(Handbook of 
Occupational Groups and Families, 1999: 36). 
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GS-0800—Engineering and Architect Group 
This group includes all classes of positions the duties of which are to 
advise on, administer, supervise, or perform professional, scientific, or 
technical work concerned with engineering or architectural projects, 
facilities, structures, systems, processes, equipment, devices, material or 
methods. Positions in this group require knowledge of the science or art, 
or both, by which materials, natural resources, and power are made useful 
(Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families, 1999: 49). 
The number of individuals interviewed and the positions in which they served included: 
Commander (1), Deputy Commander (1), Chief Engineer (1), System Sustainment 
Manager (4), Deputy Sustainment Manager (2), Contracting Officer (1), Chief of 
Financial Management (1), Program Manager (2), Equipment Specialist (2), Technical 
Order Manager (1), Core Detachment Action Group (DAG) Member (1), and Customer 
(1). The number individuals interviewed according to programs included: AFSCN (3), 
DMSP (4), GPS (2), SBIRS (1), MILSTAR (1). The remaining 7 individuals were in 
positions outside the programs. 
Dimensions of Differentiation 
Goal Differentiation. The following responses to interview questions applied to 
the dimension of goal differentiation. Goal differentiation refers to the level of difference 
in objectives being pursued by organizational units. The more goal differentiated the 
units, the more divergent their objectives. 
Response: 
I would say we have zero cross-flow in program sustainment specific 
requirements. We are stovepiped. We work for a particular program. We 
support the current ground systems in support ofthat program. We could care 
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less what the other programs are doing. We have a specific responsibility and that 
is to maintain the equipment we have fielded. 
Response: 
The greatest interest is being effective at supporting your own program and not at 
the expense of supporting across programs. I do not think anyone would agree, 
especially any SPD, with sacrificing support to his program to be effective 
providing support across programs. In other words, he would view that as his 
program suffering because of it. So I think the greater interest, and the primary 
interest, is support to a particular program. Efforts to work across programs 
therefore are secondary to the greater interest, the individual program. 
Response: 
We (the Detachment Action Group) try to look at things that are bigger than any 
one particular weapon system program. We are addressing sustainment issues 
that Air Force Space Command, 14th Air Force, and the wings are concerned with. 
And so in that vein, something we are working might not necessarily be all that 
important to the individual programs. They might think their program is running 
fine. For instance, GPS may have their issues and problems they are trying to 
tackle, but it may not have much of anything to do with what we are doing. We 
might be doing something that is really an issue spread across all the weapon 
system programs. But the individual in GPS, however, is only concerned with 
getting his contract awarded so that he can get his contractor on board finally and 
have sustained support to start meeting the requirements of the user. 
These comments exemplify the views expressed by those interviewed with respect 
to the idea that the individual programs work independently. The individual programs, 
not surprisingly, focus on their programmatic goals. None of those interviewed 
suggested otherwise. The macrostructure created by the IWSM philosophy establishes 
lines of authority that make working across programs difficult. Fiscal law constraints 
only exacerbate the situation. However, everyone expressed a willingness to work across 
programs where it made sense. In an effort to stimulate a cross-flow of ideas, the 
Commander created the Detachment Action Group (DAG). This integration mechanism 
seeks to facilitate integration between the otherwise stovepiped programs. A more 
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complete discussion of how the DAG works is discussed later in the section covering 
integration mechanisms. 
Temporal Differentiation. The following responses to interview questions applied 
to the dimension of temporal differentiation. Temporal differentiation refers to members' 
outlook towards a time horizon (short to long). The more temporally differentiated the 
units, the more their time horizons would differ. 
Response: 
For instance, a recent staff summary sheet put together by the DAG (Detachment 
Action Group), seeks to establish a common process across all the programs for 
maintenance data collection. To institute that process, the staff summary is asking 
us to sign off on a letter to be sent to the SPO Director for funding. My problem 
is that I do not have enough money to meet my current needs. If the SPO Director 
signs off on this DAG initiative, guess where the money is going to come from? 
It's going to come from the funds I need to do the sustainment of my program. 
So, I'm cutting my own throat by signing off on this initiative. They are asking 
the program directors to put extra money in their budget, but it takes a few years 
to affect the POM. So in that interim, should the SPO Director sign off on it, the 
funds will have to come from my sustainment program. We are not currently 
fully funded. Yet, you are still going to take money away from me to do this 
effort? So this is the difficulty of standardizing across programs. I think it is a 
good idea. If there is anything I hate, it is different processes that accomplish the 
same task. 
Response: 
These people in all these programs are too busy to be bothered with extra action 
items and extra projects that seek a more integrative approach. One such project 
right now is the collection of maintenance data. More specifically, the project 
focuses on maintenance data collection and analysis as well as how it is presented 
to give leadership a situational awareness picture of the health and status of the 
weapons system. If you go to the different programs, you will see it done 
differently, if it is done at all. These reports are submitted to AFMC and SAF/AQ 
to show them what we need money to fix. You will get a different picture from 
someone within this program as opposed to what the PEM in Air Force Space 
Command would tell you. The logistics guy in Air Force Space Command might 
tell you a different story as well. Anyway, that is why we are working a joint IPT 
with Air Force Space Command to get our arms around the data maintenance 
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collection process. Because if you were to ask one of the program managers to 
give up a body to accomplish this, he will not want to do that. He has other hot 
priorities he is trying to work. He may realize it is important, but it pales in 
comparison to the short-term needs of the program. Yet as a whole for all the 
programs, AFSPC, and AFMC, this project is important. 
Once again, these comments were typical of those received. The individual 
programs find themselves in a resource-constrained environment that forces them to 
adopt a short-term perspective. Although the individual programs appear 
undifferentiated temporally, they are so differentiated from the Detachment Action 
Group. As the comments demonstrate, the programs find themselves dealing more with 
day-to-day crises. Although they acknowledge the importance and benefits associated 
with many of the DAG initiatives, given current resource constraints they are 
understandably unable to support many long-term initiatives to improve sustainment for 
fear of cutting their own throat in the short-term. 
Interpersonal Differentiation. The following responses to interview questions 
applied to the dimension of interpersonal differentiation. Interpersonal differentiation 
refers to managers' orientation towards others within the organization (permissive to 
authoritarian). The higher the amount of interpersonal differentiation, the more different 
the managers' orientation towards others becomes. 
Response: 
You have too many programs with their own thoughts, ideas, and attitudes. The 
SPO Director is telling me that this is the way things are going to be done and 
that is all there is to it. It does not matter what the other programs are doing. 
Response: 
I think you have relationship issues. I think you have an apathetic attitude toward 
the processes of other programs. They all want to run their programs 
independently because they think their issues are unique. The belief is that they 
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all have different external and internal issues that other programs do not face. 
The fact that funds are provided by programs further complicates integration 
efforts. 
Response: 
The single manager is ultimately responsible for the cradle to grave management 
of a program. There is not anybody that is going to tell the single manager to use 
a particular process. Will he look at common processes? Sure. Butifhecando 
it cheaper or he can do it as good with a current process, he may be reluctant to 
change. 
Response: 
All the different programs tend to be isolated within themselves in terms of 
support even at the same location. So I do not see any horizontal support going 
on between program offices. 
The comments collected pertaining to interpersonal differentiation suggest that 
many of the system program directors and system sustainment mangers may differ in 
their personal styles and goals. This sometimes results in them wanting issues taken care 
of in their way instead of as a collective effort between programs. Some suggested that 
the maturity level of the program might influence this. The older, more established 
programs such as Air Force Satellite Control Network are viewed as having fewer 
constraints or demands than newer programs such as SBIRS. Because of less uncertainty 
and more stable funding, the mature programs are better situated to facilitate common 
processes. However because they often propose their own processes, the newer programs 
are not able to conform due to a more uncertain and constrained funding environment. 
Structural Differentiation. The following responses to interview questions 
applied to the dimension of structural differentiation. Structural differentiation refers to 
which departments differ according to structure (low to high). As structural 
differentiation increases, structural differences increase. 
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Response: 
All the SSMs have really gone about things quite a bit differently. Some of the 
programs are organic while others use contractor logistics support. One of the 
programs, AFSCN, has a depot contractor while others like MILSTAR are still 
heavily tied to the Air Logistics Centers. My program is the only one that uses a 
central repair activity to support its fielded systems. 
Response: 
The thing that is keeping them stovepiped right now is funding. The money is 
appropriated and tracked for a weapon system. When costs are tracked, they are 
tracked according to weapon systems. It would be a big convulsion of the system 
to change it. This is not to say it would not work. Like I said, you have classes of 
launch vehicles, payload busses, and payload packages. It might be possible to 
find a way to live within the existing structure but still take a commodities type 
approach to the weapon system. 
Funding or fiscal law was the only structural constraint identified. This includes 
differences in the maintenance concepts of the various programs—contractor logistics 
support (CLS) and organic. Two of the system sustainment managers provided anecdotal 
evidence to illustrate their point. They insisted that what may appear to others as 
interpersonal differences between SSMs are actually structural barriers. They described a 
situation where they had co-located sites requiring similar maintenance on their ground 
systems. However because one relied on an organic capability and the other used 
contractor logistics support, they were unable to divert the revenue steam in such a 
manner as to allow the organic program to use CLS support with respect to the common 
maintenance item. 
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Integration Mechanisms and the Role of Integrators 
The following responses to interview questions address the integration 
mechanisms within the Detachment and the perception of integrative efforts. 
Response: 
There are no formal venues to aid in the interchange of ideas. We do go through 
the Detachment Action Group every once and a while. The DAG will ask us for 
an area we would like to see improvement in. The last issue they dealt with was 
metrics. They collect all the pertinent data to determine if metrics are being done 
differently across programs. They compile the data to determine who has the best 
method. But no forum exists for technical groups to exchange ideas. 
Response: 
I have people who come to me informally asking me how we manage certain 
functions because they are experiencing problems in their programs. The problem 
is that any suggestion I offer must then be approved by their SSM. 
Response: 
The DAG is structured so that we have representation from all five Detachment 
II programs as well as core members. The rotational members have all been 
rotated from a different program. So when they come to the DAG, they have 
insight into at least two of the programs. This has been a more effective way to 
get efforts implemented within the programs. If you are not invested in the 
different programs, then all you are is a staff organization to them. Thus, we 
create buy-in through the use of the rotational members from all five programs. 
In addition, the rotational members' time are divided between their respective 
program and DAG activities. Another way we make the DAG more effective is 
their placement in the organization. Our group works closely with the 
Detachment Commander so that we have his ear on a lot of issues. When he has 
something that he needs worked, he comes to us. At the same time, the rotational 
folks are situated with the sustainment managers in such a way that they should 
have a similar relationship. Some do. Some do not. It is personality dependent. 
But we try to make sure they all have responsible positions with the SSM. That 
way when you are working an issue, it becomes a top-down effort. So, we have 
found that since we live in a stovepiped environment where we have five weapon 
systems in Detachment 11, the DAG is the best way that we know so far to work 




We have a group called the Space Systems Sustainment Working Group that 
meets twice a year for three weeks. The group consists of members from 
Detachment 11, Detachment 5, and Air Force Space Command. All the sustainers 
meet to work logistics and sustainment issues. Each meeting can generate as 
many as 20-25 action items. 
Response: 
The DAG is trying to look at common processes. We find ourselves having a 
problem adapting to common processes when the processes that we use on our 
program are dictated from our own SPO. So even if it's a common process, about 
the only thing we can do with the DAG is try to support them when they send a 
letter to the SPO Directors asking them to do something across programs. 
Response: 
My function within the SPO is matrixed. As the head ofthat function, I provide 
training for my specialty across the programs. 
Response: 
All the different programs tend to be isolated within themselves in terms of 
support even at the same location. So I do not see any horizontal support going 
on between program offices. I do know that the Detachment Commander is 
looking at every opportunity to take advantage of any synergism that would allow 
that to happen. But because he is not the SPD within these programs, it is 
something that would have to be coordinated through all of the system support 
managers to make something happen. 
Response: 
I think the SPDs look at the Detachment Commander in a support role. He aids 
he SPD in carrying out the responsibility for supporting a system through its life 
cycle. 
Response: 
The Detachment Commander that is here, from my look, is only providing 
housekeeping services. He provides no direction on how we do sustainment on 
our individual programs. He just provides infrastructure support such as 




The Detachment Commander and his staff are a support group. The money they 
get is for infrastructure. They manage the payroll funds for the civilians. They 
manage the facility. They modify the facility. They run the network downstairs. 
The comments identified three integration mechanisms: (1) the Detachment 
Action Group, (2) the Space Systems Sustainment Working Group, and (3) the 
Commander's weekly staff meetings. The Space Mission Integration Office (SMIO) was 
also identified by one individual but received nominal attention since they focus on how 
to satisfy new requirements within the space infrastructure as opposed to how to integrate 
the existing ground support systems. 
The continuity of thought with respect to integration mechanisms, however, also 
extended to the perception to their role in the Detachment. Without exception, those 
interviewed recognized the difficulty of the mechanisms in overcoming the support role 
perception held by individuals within the programs. The view often expressed was that 
the Detachment Commander lacked legitimate authority for facilitating horizontal 
integration. Although program personnel grant deference to the role of the Detachment 
Commander due to his knowledge and position, he is largely seen as providing only 
administrative infrastructure support to the programs. This view also overshadows the 
Detachment Action Group and SMIO, creations of the Detachment Commander. 
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Geographical Issues 
The following responses to interview questions address geographical issues. This 
includes the division between acquisition and sustainment as well as co-location with the 
customer. 
Division Between Acquisition and Sustainment. 
Response: 
From my perspective, there is a significant amount of truth to the perception that 
the remnants of the division between Air Force Systems Command and Air Force 
Logistics Command still exist. I think it is personality specific. I think you have 
some SPDs who have an understanding of sustainment, but I do not believe it is 
the norm. I think they have the mindset of just getting the system fielded and then 
looking toward Colorado Springs for support. I think that is the current state of 
affairs, and I do not think we should be satisfied with the current state of affairs. I 
have had a number of conversations about some ways of changing that. One 
thought that somebody came up with was having an SPD with an acquisition 
mindset and his deputy with a sustainment mindset. Or you could reverse it. You 
could have the SPD with a sustainment background with an acquisition deputy. 
Of course the thought is at the top levels having a combination of the two. I think 
this would go a long way in changing the mindset that exists now which is to 
concentrate on acquisition first and then on sustainment as an afterthought. 
Response: 
The people I talk to suggest that segregation between acquisition and logistics is 
alive and well. The IWSM concept was a noble one. The seamless support for 
weapon systems made a lot of sense, and it continues to make a lot of sense for 
systems that are both in development and sustainment at the same time. 
However, you still have the us versus them mentality. I say this having served in 
both types of organizations. You definitely see some kind of division. It may be 
due to our physical separation from the SPO in Los Angeles. The geographical 
separation probably does not help matters. 
Response: 
A big problem I see is that the SPOs are located in Los Angeles and sustainment 
is located in Colorado Springs. We do not have their ready ear since we are not 
geographically co-located with them. There is a Los Angeles versus Colorado 
Springs mentality. The practice of acquisition throwing a system over the fence 
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to sustainment that existed under Air Force Systems Command and Air Force 
Logistics Command still exists today under IWSM. 
Response: 
If you have an SPD and his or her deputy both being acquisition minded and 
giving little appreciation to logistics and sustainment, then the rest of the 
organization will adopt that same mindset. But if you have a situation where you 
have the SPD being of one mindset, either acquisition or logistics and 
sustainment, or the deputy being such, then you do not have the right balance in 
order to focus on both sustainment and acquisition. Right now, I see too much 
focus on acquisition and not enough on sustainment. I think it is because you do 
not have the right mixture of leadership to emphasize both. I thought having a 
product center commander with sustainment and logistics experience would 
change things. I think he has probably set on a road to do that. But when people 
are not willing to change their mindset, it becomes a difficult task. I am hoping 
he will begin to challenge SPDs' thinking to ensure they have thought through 
sustainment issues. To an extent, I think I am beginning to see that. 
The comments received suggest that the geographical separation between the 
product center and Detachment 11 is counter-productive to the r\VSM concept. Although 
not reflected in the comments included, one Deputy SSM stated that he was satisfied with 
the relationship between the two offices. However, this appeared to be the exception 
rather than the rule. The general consensus was that the separation contributed to an out 
of sight—out of mind attitude. 
Co-Location with Customer. 
Response: 
It seems to me to make a lot of sense that the part of an organization responsible 
for the operational support of a system be co-located with the organization 
operating the system. Such an arrangement seems to provide for effective 
communication. It seems to provide for a greater appreciation of the sensitivities 
the operational command may have. I think that communication would be less 
effective without such an arrangement. There certainly could be exceptions. But 
it seems to me that co-location fosters the team concept. 
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Response: 
I think Air Force Space Command looks upon us favorably. With the last round 
of BRAC closures, there was an attempt to move us out of Colorado Springs to 
the product or air logistics center. However, that initiative failed due to the 
negative reaction from Air Force Space Command. They are very happy having 
us just down the road where they can find us. 
Response: 
The co-location did not drive a better relationship at first. I think what has driven 
the better relationship has been the greater emphasis on sustainment due to the 
age of our space systems. This need creates a common enemy. The greater 
emphasis on sustainment has forced a closer relationship between the customer 
and the sustainment personnel. Co-location has facilitated the building ofthat 
relationship. The co-location with Detachment 11 allows us (the customer) to 
travel across the base and consult face to face with the sustainment personnel. 
For instance, we the customer have been bad about collecting data to provide back 
to the SPOs, and the SPOs have been bad about insisting on getting that 
information. The increased emphasis on sustainment is forcing this to change and 
co-location helps. 
There was continuity of thought with respect to this issue. Everyone agreed that 
co-location with the customer enabled Detachment 11 and Space Command to work 
together more effectively. No dissenting opinions were expressed. 
Process Mapping, Tacit Knowledge Capture, and Information Technology 
The following response addresses the capture of tacit knowledge through the use 
of process mapping and information technology. 
Response: 
When you look at implementing issues across the programs, one of the tools that 
has been useful is the idea of capturing processes. In a rigorous manner, we 
interview all of the players involved in the process and review all relevant 
material such as operating instructions. The first step is always to capture the 
existing process or processes so that you have a baseline from which to work. 
Then, we identify the weak areas of the process and try to improve them. The end 
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result is that instead of a package of written documents occupying a binder, you 
have some diagrams and flow charts that lay out what individuals should be 
doing. By placing it on the local area network, all the programs have insight into 
the processes and the ability to improve upon them. An example of a success 
story is the software version release process in the Missile Warning and Space 
Surveillance System Program. They started over a year ago on their software 
version release process. Almost immediately following the capture of their 
process, two of their senior engineers retired and left. Normally, all their 
knowledge would have gone out the door with them since most of it existed only 
in their head. Also, most of the people in the program had a different view of 
how the process worked. It was personality dependent. Now, they all have an 
agreed to process. So when the experts leave, they do not lose anything. They 
still have knowledge of the process. Another example is the efforts by the Space 
Environmental Sensing System and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
to capture their configuration management process. They had some real success. 
Their ability to capture the process helped them iron out difficulties in the process 
with their SPO in Los Angeles. Had they not captured the process, it would have 
been a more difficult and painful process to hammer out differences in the two 
parties' positions. We even helped Air Force Space Command get their arms 
around their modification ranking process. 
The issue of process mapping was not one addressed by most respondents. 
However, those who did discuss it considered it to be a beneficial initiative. The focus 
was not on standardization of processes but on the ability to capture organizational 
knowledge. Documentation of various processes allows the Detachment to capture tacit 
knowledge that otherwise would be lost due to personnel turnover. Another benefit of 
this has been the ability to improve upon existing processes. The Detachment uses their 
local area network to offer the programs a virtual library of processes. Rather than re- 
invent existing processes, the programs gain insight into what other programs are doing 
and use them as a starting point. 
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Analysis 
The difficulties with integration experienced by Detachment 11 can be analyzed 
from both a micro and macrostructure perspective. Both approaches offer insight into the 
frustrations many Detachment 11 personnel experience in their attempts to horizontally 
integrate the five programs. The pragmatic literature review serves as the primary data 
source for analyzing the macrostructure. The literature explicitly defines the dominant 
structure and strategy from a macro-perspective. Interview responses were also included 
where relevant. However, most of the interview responses were used in the micro- 
analysis. 
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Macrostructure Analysis. The macrostructure analysis of the situation provides 
an overarching context for considering the problem. Figure 4 depicts the macrostructure 
framework. 
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Figure 4. Vertical Integration Strategy—Transition From Function to Product 
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Figure 4 depicts the vertical integration strategy associated with the IWSM concept. As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 3, this strategy seeks to avoid, or at least reduce the 
likelihood, of accepting false acquisition savings only to encounter higher sustainment 
costs during fielding by consolidating authority for the weapon system life cycle, both 
acquisition and sustainment, in one individual, the SPD. This consolidation of authority 
resulted from the migration away from the horizontal integration concept toward a 
vertical integration strategy necessitating a shift in the macrostructure of the 
organizations responsible for the procurement and sustainment of weapon systems. The 
deactivation of the functionally oriented Air Force Logistics and Air Force Systems 
Commands and the activation of the product oriented Air Force Materiel Command 
represents the structural transformation designed to achieve this new system or product 
strategy. Figure 4 illustrates this change. 
The data collected indicates that this shift may not be accomplishing its intended 
purpose. Most of those interviewed who addressed the issue suggested that the system 
approach still has not taken hold and that the remnants of AFSC and AFLC are alive and 
well. Two principal reasons were given to explain this segregation between acquisition 
and logistics. First, interviewees expressed their concern that, in general, the senior 
leadership lacks significant sustainment experience. The view is that more often than 
not, the SPDs possess predominantly acquisition backgrounds with insufficient 
experience or training in logistics and sustainment. Sustainment personnel say they find 
themselves attending acquisition professional development courses, yet acquisition 
personnel, in large part, do not attend logistics courses. The second reason cited for the 
us versus them mentality is the geographical separation between the SPOs and 
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Detachment 11. This factor was identified to be both an advantage and disadvantage. 
Some viewed the separation as a buffer that prevents acquisition concerns from 
overshadowing sustainment issues altogether. It also allows sustainment personnel to be 
closer to their customer thereby improving communication. The negative aspect is that 
the separation complicates communication with the SPO. Despite the overwhelming 
consistency of the views expressed here, it seems important to note that one individual 
(Deputy SSM) interviewed thought the system functioned as intended and found no 
shortcomings with the existing organizational arrangement. 
The macrostructure establishes the larger environment in which the 
microstructure integration mechanisms must operate. The product oriented 
macrostructure environment is one characterized by differentiation. The dominant 
product strategy and structure, accompanied by the bureaucratic nature of the Air Force, 
tend to attract the organizations towards the polar management extremity of 
differentiation. This differentiation at the macro-level appears to stifle integration efforts 
at the micro-level. 
Microstructure Analysis. The microstructure analysis, according to Boschken, 
provides the more meaningful level of analysis. Although the Detachment itself can be 
viewed as a macro-level integration mechanism, the microstructure analysis gives insight 
into how personnel actually accomplish their work on a daily basis. 
The comments received suggest that the programs remain highly differentiated at 
the micro-level in three of the areas identified by Lawrence and Lorsch: goal orientation, 
interpersonal, and structural. Each of the programs tends to have a myopic view 
consisting of only their goals. The dominant macrostructure encourages this. The 
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programmatic alignment found in the macrostructure is mirrored in the microstructure 
perpetuating the situation. Program personnel's performance is measured in terms of 
their effectiveness at supporting the ground segment of their space system, not across 
space systems. Life cycle costs are tracked according to individual weapon systems. 
Historically, the systems evolved using different maintenance concepts. Fiscal law 
serves as another structural barrier. As a result, no incentive exists for individuals to 
incur an inconvenience or additional cost even if it resulted in a greater benefit or reduced 
cost to another program or programs. Furthermore, even though personnel indicated a 
willingness to undertake such initiatives, the structural constraints do not permit them to 
do so in many cases. Therefore, the product orientation in the microstructure tends to 
inhibit the cross-flow of ideas. The differentiation in goals, however, is not without 
merit. It fosters a high level of customer focus. The benefit of this focus does have a 
drawback though in cases where a single customer interacts with more than one product. 
As Galbraith identified, the product structure in these situations sometimes fails to 
present a single face to a customer who uses more than one product of an organization. 
The disparity of maintenance data collection procedures and reporting between the 
various programs illustrates this shortcoming. 
Despite high levels of differentiation, the Detachment seems to be moving away 
from the polar extremity of differentiation by creating integration mechanisms. The most 
notable mechanism is the Detachment Action Group. A creation of the Detachment 
Commander, this mechanism arguably complies with most of the eight factors outlined 
by Galbraith for establishing a suitable power base: (1) structuring of the role, (2) staffing 
choice, (3) status of the role, (4) information systems, (5) planning process, (6) reward 
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systems, (7) budget authority, and (8) dual authority. Viewing the Detachment 
Commander as the "chief integrator" satisfies both the role-structuring factor and the 
status requirement. Since the Detachment Action Group reports directly to him, the 
mechanism garners organizational clout. The achievement of these two factors, however, 
resulted from the initiatives of the current Commander rather than through a formal 
designation from higher levels. This lack of formal authority contributes to the 
commonly expressed view that the Commander is responsible only for providing 
administrative support to the programs. 
The process of staffing the Detachment Action Group resembles an 
interdepartmental exchange program. Figure 5 provides a pictorial depiction of how the 
DAG works. 
Effective M atrix 
Support to SSMs 
Best Personnel 
Career Progression 
Two Year Trial Effort - 
First of its Kind for SMC! 
Figure 5. Detachment Action Group Rotational Program 
(Adapted from October 2000 Briefing) 
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Those selected to work in the DAG on a rotational basis generally possess experience 
from at least two of the five programs. They divide their time between DAG activities 
and the current program they are assigned to. This division not only creates buy-in from 
the individual programs, but also allows the members to continue monitoring the pulse of 
their respective programs. The placement of the DAG rotational members in responsible 
positions with system sustainment managers further ensures integrators receive the 
appropriate support or status. Complementing this, DAG rotational members 
automatically receive a one-grade promotion while serving in their integrator roles. The 
DAG, however, is more than an interdepartmental exchange designed to familiarize 
personnel with other programs and de-differentiate their job skills. Although such 
programs are beneficial, pure interdepartmental programs are passive in nature. Instead, 
the DAG provides a forum for actively pursuing integration across the programs. Figure 
6 shows the charter for the Detachment Action Group. 
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Across All Weapon 
Systems 
Figure 6. Goals, Objectives, and Tasks of the Detachment Action Group 
(Adapted from October 2000 Briefing) 
As the figure indicates, most of the objectives contain the adjective common or horizontal 
further substantiating the role of the DAG as the principle integration mechanism. 
The difficulties experienced by the Detachment Action Group can be attributed to 
a lack of two of Galbraith's factors: dual authority and budget. The absence of dual 
authority appears to be the least of the two shortcomings. The referent and expert 
authority of the current Commander and his staff, accompanied by strong collegial 
leadership within the Detachment, compensate for the perceived lack of legitimate 
authority. The more troubling of the two is that the principal integration mechanism 
lacks budget authority to provide the requisite investment dollars to accomplish its 
mission. Instead, the DAG tries to overcome this environmental constraint by obtaining 
funding from outside the Detachment through programs such as the Reduction in Total 
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Ownership Cost Program and the Computer Resources Support Improvement Program 
(CRSIP). Such sources, however, come with their own constraints. If an initiative falls 
outside the domain of the aforementioned programs, the DAG is not even able to compete 
for the investment dollars. This tends to confine DAG activities to cost reduction 
initiatives (the focus of most external funding sources) unless they are able to obtain 
funding from all the individual programs. Therefore, the DAG relies almost exclusively 
on the support of Detachment 11 programs to accomplish its first goal and accompanying 
objectives (reflected in Figure 6). Program personnel's preoccupation with day-to-day 
crises in many cases tends to create an insurmountable hurdle for the DAG. 
Summary 
In the early 1990's, Air Force Materiel Command was formed to manage Air 
Force weapon systems along product lines. The effects of such a strategy and 
organizational structure can be seen in the responses received. This strategy appears to 
promote goal, interpersonal, and structural differentiation between the programs of 
Detachment 11. To compensate for this polarization, integration mechanisms such as the 
Detachment Action Group, Space Systems Sustainment Working Group, and the Space 
Mission Integration Office were created to seek greater integration between programs. 
Currently, however, efforts to seek a more balanced approach between product and 
functional orientation appear to be stifled by the rigorous adherence to the dominant 
strategy and structure associated with the Integrated Weapon Systems Management 
philosophy. 
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Chapter V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overview 
This Chapter presents the answers to the research questions stated in Chapter 1 
along with recommendations for improving the organizational climate and structure of 
Detachment 11. Then, the limitations of this research are presented along with potential 
topics for future research. 
Research Question 1: Does the current organizational structure fit the Detachment's 
strategy of providing integrated system support management? 
The current organizational structure, absent the macrostructure demands imposed 
upon the Detachment, does not represent the appropriate choice for a strategy of 
horizontal integration. The objectives of standardization, reduced redundancies, and 
increased communication represent the strengths of a functional organization, not a 
product organization. A pure product structure promotes differentiation and is ill suited 
for accomplishing the Detachment's strategy of providing integrated system support 
management. Although the Detachment created integration mechanisms in an attempt to 
move away from a pure product structure, the data indicates that the programs within 
Detachment 11 still remain stovepiped. 
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Research Question 2: If there is a mismatch, what causes the disparity between 
strategy and structure? 
Detachment 11 is structured to achieve the macro-level strategy represented by 
the Integrated Weapon Systems Management philosophy. The IWSM strategy seeks to 
reduce costs and cycle time. The product structure represents the appropriate 
organization to accommodate these objectives.   The strengths of this structure are that it 
is well suited for managing cost as a system, facilitating cycle time reduction, and 
providing greater focus or specialization (differentiation). 
The disadvantages of the product structure, however, suggest that such an 
organization is not conducive to Detachment 11 's micro-strategy of providing integrated 
system support management. A pure product structure creates redundancy due to poor 
communication between products. It also presents multiple faces to customers using 
more than one of Detachment 11 's systems. The inconsistency in data management 
collection and reporting between the programs illustrates this shortcoming. These 
disadvantages, imposed upon the Detachment by its macro-environment lead to 
frustrations experienced by personnel. In short, the macro-strategy and micro-strategy 
are at different polar ends of the spectrum. The regulatory nature of the macro-strategy 
requires that such a conflict be resolved in its favor. Absent the Integrated Weapon 
System Management environment the Detachment operates in, the micro-strategy of the 
Detachment may be better suited for a functional structure. However, as Lawrence and 
Lorsch argue, the most successful organizations achieve high levels of both integration 
and differentiation. 
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Research Question 3: What formal or informal organizational mechanisms 
currently exist to facilitate integration between programs? 
The Detachment uses several mechanisms to facilitate integration between 
programs. These mechanisms include the Detachment Action Group, the Space Mission 
Integration Office, the Space Systems Sustainment Working Group, and the 
Commander's weekly staff meetings. The intent of these mechanisms is to allow the 
Detachment to achieve a more balanced approach between integration and differentiation. 
Such an approach would allow the Detachment to satisfy the demands of the IWSM 
environment while at the same time rejecting the bipolar paradigm with which this issue 
is normally viewed. However, the data suggests, at least with respect to the Detachment 
Action Group, that such mechanisms currently lack the requisite authority and resources 
to effectively accomplish meaningful horizontal integration. The DAG relies almost 
exclusively on the programs for funding. This hampers its ability to facilitate integration 
since program personnel identify more with the macrostructure and strategy than the 
microstructure and strategy due to the regulatory nature of it. Even when they obtain 
outside funding, such initiatives tend to focus on cost reduction and not the larger goal of 
improved sustainment. 
Research Question 4: What improvements can be made in the organization's 
integration mechanisms? 
Recommendation 1.   The Detachment has adapted to its environment in a manner 
consistent with the concepts of the relevant literature. The friction, however, appears to 
be the result of a failure to recognize and emphasize the importance of the Detachment's 
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integration mechanisms. Formal recognition from outside the Detachment may be 
needed to change perceptions regarding the legitimacy of such mechanisms. Perhaps the 
most significant step towards creating a more suitable power base would be the 
establishment of a budget for the Detachment Action Group to facilitate integration 
between programs. This could help solidify the role of the DAG within the programs. 
Recommendation 2. Another potential improvement might be to transition more 
towards a matrix organization. "Many organizations have turned to a matrix design to 
address the limitations of mechanistic or bureaucratic structures. Recall that a matrix 
organization represents a balance between organizing resources by product or function" 
(Hellriegel, 1998: 603). To an extent, the Detachment has already done this in the area of 
financial management and contracting. The matrix organization recognizes the 
importance of the functional department in such matters as continuity, training, and 
resource allocation. The potential benefit is a better utilization of manpower by allowing 
the requirements to pull the necessary personnel into the programs. This also allows 
personnel to broaden their professional knowledge. The shortcoming, however, would be 
the loss of focus on an individual program that may not be well received by the SPDs or 
customer. 
Limitations of Research 
The results of this thesis have significant limitations. The selection of the 
respondents was the result of a sample of convenience and the number of respondents 
was limited to 18 people due to resource constraints. These limitations introduce the 
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possibility that the views expressed by the respondents may not be representative of the 
relevant population, in this case Detachment 11 personnel. It also made it difficult to 
analyze the data to assess inter- and intra-case reliability according to programs. As a 
result, the data was only considered in the aggregate. However, the consistency in 
answers in the aggregate suggests the same result would be achieved. The external 
validity and generalizability are also limited by the sampling technique. Another related 
limitation was the inability to include the views of the SPOs located in Los Angeles. 
Future Research Topics 
The following topics arose during the course of this thesis providing opportunities 
for future research. 
Topic 1. Perform a quantitative analysis of relevant cost and schedule data of 
acquisition programs prior and subsequent to the implementation of IWSM to determine 
if the vertical integration strategy actually reduced incidents of negative cost and 
schedule variance. 
Topic 2. Examine SPD career paths to determine their level of education and 
training in acquisition and sustainment. Does a balance exist? 
Topic 3. Conduct a survey to determine whether the formation of AFMC 
represents a seamless union of AFSC and AFLC. 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
Instructions: Thank you for participating in this study. With your permission, I would 
like to tape the interview so that an accurate transcript can be made at a later date. If you 
should consent and later become uncomfortable with the interview being taped, please 
bring it to my attention and the taping will be stopped. Please understand that all answers 
given will not be attributed to any individual but may be associated with a collection of 
individuals, (i.e. System Sustainment Mangers, Item Managers, Finance Officers, etc.). 
However, the names of those interviewed will remain confidential, and your name will 
not be released without your permission. Since these interviews do constitute the bulk of 
the data collected, the more precise you can be in your answers, the more beneficial your 
interview will be. For instance, an answer such as "DOD Instruction 5000.1 does not 
permit that action to be taken" would be preferable than the generic answer "regulations 
do not permit that action." Do you have any questions before we start? 
1. Do you consent to have the interview taped? 
2. What is your name and grade? 
3. What program do you work in? 
4. What is your duty title? 
5. Please briefly describe the duties associated with this position. 
6. How long have you worked in your current job? 
7. Who oversees your daily activities? 
8. Who sets the sustainment goals for your program? 
9. What are the goals, in descending order of priority, for your program? 
10. Who sets the sustainment strategy for your program? 
11. To what extent do you (or others within your program) communicate with others 
within the Detachment but outside your program concerning work-related activities? 
12. What types of issues are addressed through these communications? 
13. What factors, if any, tend to impede such communications? 
14. What factors, if any, tend to facilitate such communications? 
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15. What resources do you or others within your program have in common with other 
programs? 
16. To what extent do programs within the Detachment share such resources? 
17. What factors, if any, tend to impede the sharing of such resources (i.e. technology, 
political, legal, cultural, regulatory, etc.) 
18. What factors, if any, tend to facilitate such exchanges? 
19. Who do you turn to for help when you have a sustainment problem you cannot 
resolve? 
20. How often are problems resolved across platforms? 
21. Is it more important to do your job effectively within your program or across other 
programs? 
22. Are you encouraged to work with other programs in an effort to save money for 
common tasks or items? 
23. Would you be willing to take an action that saved all programs a significant amount 
of resources, if it inconvenienced your program? 
24. How frequently do you solve sustainment issues across platforms? 
25. Were you involved in sustainment efforts on the same or similar systems prior to the 
formation of Detachment 11? 
26. If the answer to 25 is yes, then how has the creation of Detachment 11 changed the 
way you do your job? 
26. Please provide your assessment of who plays a more influential role in the 
sustainment efforts of your program, the System Program Director or the Detachment 
Commander, along with the method by which they exert such influence (i.e. sets policy, 
provides resources, writes performance appraisals, etc.). 
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